In the discourse of 18th-century British intellectuals the term 'luxury' held a well-recognized and much disputed place. Dispute arose chiefly around the problem of disentangling the economic, moral-theological and political strands of the term. The object of the present paper is to trace forward the history of debate over the concept along one develop ing line of specialization - that of 19th-century political economy. It will be seen how the term luxury (and related terms: necessity, decency, productive, unproductive, etc.) adjusted (...) meaning(s) as the economic, social and intellectual contexts in which it was embedded themselves mutated. In particular, it is argued, the changing significance attached to the term illustrates the extent to which a key 19th-century intellec tual elite managed to accommodate the implications of a transition from a society based on assumptions of scarcity and hierarchy to one that was beginning to contemplate the possibility of mass market abun dance. While the profession's leaders did develop a sharpened interest in aspiration to luxury consumption as a legitimate motor of economic growth, all registered their disapproval of certain forms of the aspira tion, revealing in the process a variety of class, gender and 'race' pre occupations - including (from J. S. Mill onwards) a particular distaste for positional or status-related consumption. (shrink)

Eighteenth-century England saw the rise of a "peculiarly English" art form—landscape gardening—and a corresponding change in attitudes toward the antural world. While the French, who lived under tyranny, had a tightly organized, restrictive gardens, the "free" English enjoyed gardens where they were at liberty to wander. John Dixon Hunt examines eighteenth-century letters, literary and critical works, biographies, paintings, prints, and drawings to trace the gradual movement from formal regularity toward a carefully calculated naturalness.

Contrairement à ce que peut suggérer l ’ expression de lumière naturelle lorsqu ’ il en est question, le cogito n ’ est pas une vérité de la raison. La raison est révoquée en doute au moment où il survient et ne saurait donc en assurer la vérité. Ce rôle est dévolu à la réflexivité de l ’ acte par lequel la pensée se constitue son propre objet lorsqu ’ elle affirme Je suis : immédiatement accessible à elle-même, c ’ (...) est une chose dans le monde, et par conséquent un existant, qu ’ elle saisit ainsi, non pas une représentation. Le cogito est ainsi inextricablement impliqué dans un acte certes, mais cet acte n ’ est pas le performatif qu ’ a voulu en faire Hintikka. La proposition qui l ’ exprime s ’ apparente en fait à une contingente : selon l ’ analyse ici proposée, il lui est en effet possible d ’ être fausse. (shrink)

L'absence d'une analyse quelconque du concept de vérité a de quoi surprendre dans un discours qui se propose de dire à quelles conditions s'obtient cette vérité. C'est pourtant bien de cette carence que souffrent les Méditations. A l'exception d'une brève allusion, dans la Cinquième Méditation, attribuable d'ailleurs à Clerselier, et dans une traduction remaniée par lui mais non approuvée par Descartes, le mot « vérité » n'y est défini nulle part.

The book is comprised of essays that utilize Shakespeare as a productive window into topics of contemporary social and political relevance. Its interdisciplinary qualities make the book relevant for students of political studies, literature, philosophy, cultural studies, and history.

In Not God Enough, J.D. Greear explains that the thing between you and the vibrant faith you want isn't answers to all our spiritual questions, but an escape from the small God we've imagined in place of an actual encounter with the real, awesome, glorious God of the Bible.

We show that if the weak compactness of a cardinal is made indestructible by means of any preparatory forcing of a certain general type, including any forcing naively resembling the Laver preparation, then the cardinal was originally supercompact. We then apply this theorem to show that the hypothesis of supercompactness is necessary for certain proof schemata.